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Abstract
Studies of political polarization in socialmedia demonstratemixed evidence forwhether discussions necessarily evolve into
left and right ideological echo chambers. Recent research shows that, for political and issue-based discussions, patterns of
user clusterization may differ significantly, but that cross-cultural evidence of the polarization of users on certain issues is
close to non-existent. Furthermore, most of the studies developed network proxies to detect users’ grouping, rarely taking
into account the content of the Tweets themselves. Our contribution to this scholarly discussion is founded upon the detec-
tion of polarization based on attitudes towards political actors expressed by users in Germany, the USA and Russia within
discussions on inter-ethnic conflicts. For this exploratory study, we develop a mixed-method approach to detecting user
grouping that includes: crawling for data collection; expert coding of Tweets; user clusterization based on user attitudes;
construction of word frequency vocabularies; and graph visualization. Our results show that, in all the three cases, the
groups detected are far from being conventionally left or right, but rather that their views combine anti-institutionalism,
nationalism, and pro- and anti-minority views in varying degrees. In addition to this, more than two threads of political
debate may co-exist in the same discussion. Thus, we show that the debate that sees Twitter as either a platform of ‘echo
chambering’ or ‘opinion crossroads’ may be misleading. In our opinion, the role of local political context in shaping (and
explaining) user clusterization should not be under-estimated.
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1. Introduction
Today, social polarization is believed to be growing both
along traditional and newer lines along which schisms
form (Duca & Saving, 2017), of which political ones are,
arguably, the sharpest. Despite the ever-increasing body
of knowledge on political attitudes and alignments on-
line, we still lack understanding of how political divisions
show up in issue-oriented discussions andwhether there
is a cross-country pattern.
Despite all the well-described representation distor-
tions (Daniels, 2013), the content of social media is still
used for predicting consumer and/or electoral choices
(Colleoni, Rozza, & Arvidsson, 2014), and the studies of
political polarization on social media, including Twitter,
are growing in popularity (Barberá, 2014). However,
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there are several shortcomings in today’s studies of po-
litical polarization in user-generated content.
Thus, in most cases, audience polarization is stud-
ied by examining purely political issues or events, while
social conflicts of race, gender or religious origins with
both evident and idiosyncratic polarization and politi-
cisation (McCright & Dunlap, 2011) are rarely studied.
Due to context and language differences, multi-country
studies are also rare, especially where both established
democracies and countries beyond the Euro-Atlantics
are included, as, for most observers, these remain po-
litically incomparable. However, conditions other than
political regimes may create grounds for cross-cultural
juxtapositions (Bodrunova, Litvinenko, & Blekanov, 2018;
Bodrunova, Blekanov, & Maksimov, 2017).
Another conceptual limitation is that, even in the
most advanced studies, the detection of users’ politi-
cal affiliations or ideologies is done via proxies, most of-
ten via structural network factors, such as: friendship
affiliations; patterns of following (Barberá, Jost, Nagler,
Tucker, & Bonneau, 2015; Rivero, 2017); or content shar-
ing (Colleoni et al., 2014), which could be misleading.
Addressing this gap, newer works show that group polar-
ization in social media may be studied by looking at user
texts, including complex referrals to specific phenomena
that matter for group identity (Evolvi, 2017). We argue
that the analysis of political divisions needs to unite both
structural and content aspects (Bodrunova, 2018).
In order to bridge these gaps in previous studies, we
look at Twitter discussions regarding inter-ethnic clashes;
they have similar conflict triggers and structure of so-
cial groups involved into conflict (Bodrunova, Litvinenko,
& Blekanov, 2017). Whilst avoiding making straightfor-
ward comparisons, we explore users’ political polariza-
tion and suggest amixedmethod to detect it across three
cases in different political regimes: the USA; Germany;
and Russia. By the UN estimates of 2013–2017, these
countries have recently been the three most attractive
countries tomigrants in the world (United Nations, 2013,
2017) and have all witnessed violent inter-ethnic clashes
that became global trending topics on Twitter.
This article, thus, is organized as follows: In Section 1,
we review the approaches of assessing user polarization
on social media and the conflicts under our scrutiny. In
Section 2, we formulate the research questions and de-
scribe our methodology. In Section 3, we provide the re-
sults; in Section 4, we interpret and discuss them.
2. Political Polarization on Twitter: The Current State
of Research
2.1. Political Polarization Studies and the Current
Research Gaps
Throughout recent years, mixed evidence has persisted
in social media studies on whether users go online to
agree or to argue (Yardi & Boyd, 2010). Research into
echo chambers (Colleoni et al., 2014; Sunstein, 2002)
has shown that user homophily, both structurally and se-
mantically, may prevent the formation of online ‘opinion
crossroads’, as there is ‘evidence of persistent ideologi-
cal sorting in online communication networks’ (Barberá,
2014, p. 2). However, a range of works point to the oppo-
site effects in Twitter communication, with weaker ties
responsible for the diversification of the consumption
of political information (Barberá, 2014) as well as differ-
ent platform features on Twitter leading simultaneously
to echo chambers and inter-community communication
(Conover et al., 2011). Thus, evidence suggests more re-
search is needed to assess the patterns of users’ political
clusterization on social networks.
Until today, most Twitter polarization studies are
bound to the one-country-one-case strategy—with a few
notable exceptions (Barberá, 2014; Barberá et al., 2015).
Another problem arises from today’s understanding of
online political polarization (Bramson et al., 2016) as a
situation when ‘a social or political group is divided into
two opposing sub-groups having conflicting and contrast-
ing positions, goals and viewpoints, with few individu-
als remaining neutral or holding an intermediate posi-
tion’ (Guerra, Meira, Cardie, & Kleinberg, 2013, p. 215;
cf. Isenberg, 1986; Sunstein, 2002).
Empirical evidence suggests that, if a heterogeneous
group containing users with two opposing views has a
non-zero cross-view retweet rate, it will end up as two
polarized communities (Conover et al., 2011). Following
this logic, the studies of political polarization result in pre-
defined binary descriptions of polarized communities—
see Morales, Borondo, Losada, and Benito (2015) for
Venezuela; Agathangelou, Katakis, Rori, Gunopulos, and
Richards (2017) for Greece; or Weber, Garimella, and
Batayneh (2013) for Egypt.
However, for studies beyond the two-party electoral
process, it seems useful to remember that polarization is
an individual case of clusterization along schismatic lines,
disregarding the number of resulting clusters (Esteban
& Ray, 1994). In social conflicts, conflicting groups are
not necessarily structured along binary political party
divisions. The classic work of Tajfel and Turner (1979)
shows how social identity (including ethnic identity) di-
vides in- and out-groups, while a later normative model
of dissent in social groups (Packer, 2008) implies that, in
inter-ethnic conflicts, the majority may divide into pro-
minority and anti-minority clusters if the anti-minority at-
titude is perceived as harmful to the collective (Packer &
Chasteen, 2010, p. 5). Also, the very political spectramay
be highly multi-dimensional, as The Manifesto Project
(https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/) or Polity Project
(http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm) sug-
gest. Thus, we consider polarization more as multi-polar
fragmentation of divergent clusters, of which bipolar
clusterization is just an option.
Non-bipolar clusterization seems to be especially
probable for ‘issue’ or ‘ad hoc’ publics (Bruns & Burgess,
2011; Papacharissi, 2015) that emerge on social net-
works. This claim is supported by research on the
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topic and issue-based discussions (Elgesem, Steskal, &
Diakopoulos, 2015). In single case studies, user polar-
ization has been studied in regard to abortion, same-
sex marriage, gun control, and climate change (Elgesem,
2017; Guerra et al., 2013; Yardi & Boyd, 2010), with
varying degrees and directions of polarization detected.
Moreover, there is a clear difference in polarization pat-
terns between political and non-political issues (Barberá
et al., 2015). But the evidence of differences in polariza-
tion patterns is still scarce in academic literature.
The biggest challenge in today’s polarization stud-
ies is that instead of taking into account the actual con-
tent of user posts, detection of users’ political affilia-
tions is conducted via proxies. Of those, the most inter-
esting results come from assessing structural network
factors such as friendship affiliations (Barberá & Rivero,
2015), retweeting patterns (Guerra, Veloso, Meira, &
Almeida, 2011), patterns of political following (Barberá
et al., 2015; Rivero, 2017) or content-sharing patterns
(Adamic & Glance, 2005; Bakshy, Messing, & Adamic,
2015; Colleoni et al., 2014; Elgesem, 2017). However, us-
ing proxies may be misleading (Adamic & Glance, 2005)
and even express analysis of actual tweets shows the ex-
treme diversity of political views, both in the form of di-
rect expression and in opinionated content.
However, if not proxies, then what? Several studies
suggest that group polarization in socialmediamay be ex-
amined by analysing complex user referrals to phenom-
ena that matter for their identity and group alignment
(Evolvi, 2017), as it is how the attitudes are expressed
in natural language. In the simplest possible terms, one
would take user attitudes (positive, negative, and neu-
tral) towards particular objects for such referrals.
Thus,wewill try to construct groupdivisions from the
actual Tweet content by coding user referrals towards po-
litical players and then defining which of these attitudes
divide the users most, and for how many clusters.
2.2. Lexicon-Based Approaches to the Analysis of User
Polarization
The area of research closest to our idea of bringing con-
tent into polarization studies is a lexicon-based analy-
sis of Twitter data. In recent years, the field has expe-
rienced explosive growth, predominantly based on the
analysis of sentiments. Without delving fully into these
methodologies, wewill simply note that the possibility of
use of vocabulary-based approaches for polarization as-
sessment tasks (Hillmann & Trier, 2012) is usually based
on combining lexical and structural analysis. Several re-
searchers went beyond so-called ‘naïve’ sentiment and
have tried to link affect (Stieglitz & Dang-Xuan, 2012) or
appraisal (Dang-Xuan, Stieglitz, Wladarsch, & Neuberger,
2013) in user texts, types of lexical units (Speriosu, Sudan,
Upadhyay, & Baldridge, 2011), and structural elements
of Twitter discussions, like graphs of following or speed
and volume of Tweet dissemination. Using these and
other works, one could conclude that a sentiment-based
approach to detecting left and right differences would
imply developing a ‘negative’ (say, leftist) + neutral +
‘positive’ (say, rightist) lexicon and applying them to the
discussion bulk. However, the problem that we have run
into with this approach is the following:
(1) The users expressed not ‘left views’ or ‘right views’
but attitudes (with their lexical markers) towards
politicians, institutions, social groups, or events
(‘actors’);
(2) A given user would express attitudes towards not
just one but many actors of different political
stances;
(3) The same user could express recognized-
as-rightist attitudes towards one actor and
recognized-as-leftist attitudes towards another ac-
tor of comparable significance (e.g., immigrants
and nationalists);
(4) The same user could express negative views on
both leftist and rightist actors (say, Barak Obama
and the KKK in the USA).
In case (3), the user’s preferences, as measured by one-
dimensional positive/negative sentiment analysis, would
create a zero-sum, and assigning the bias would not be
possible. In case (4), an at least two-dimensional mea-
surement of the political spectrum is needed. Taking this
into consideration, we have further developed our re-
search questions and the exploratory research design
based on user sentiment, but not on pre-defined target-
independent lexicons. Instead, to better capture user at-
titudes, we will use expert coding of Tweets, standardis-
ing the coding process with the help of the idea of ‘com-
plex user referrals’ by Evolvi (2017).
2.3. The Research Cases
As stated above, we have studied three intergroup con-
flicts of ethnic or racial origins in the three leading im-
migration recipient countries: the USA, Germany, and
Russia. Direct comparisons of ad hoc discussions (Bruns
& Burgess, 2011) are currently viewed with some doubt
in academic literature.Without developing a strictly com-
parative research design, we have argued elsewhere
(Bodrunova, Litvinenko, & Blekanov, 2017; Bodrunova,
Blekanov, & Maksimov, 2017) that the conflicts we
picked for the analysis are similar enough as research
cases. They share a range of attributes: a violent interper-
sonal trigger, outbursts of public discussion acrossmedia
platforms (becoming trending topics on Twitter), social
polarization along the inter-ethnic or inter-race chasms,
street action, and involvement of federal authorities. In
addition, they were chosen because they were the first
in a line of similar conflictual cases and, at least partly,
set the communicative patterns for later discussions.
The cases are described as follows:
1) A violent uprising against immigrants from Central
Asia in the district of Biryulyovo, Moscow, Russia, in
Media and Communication, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 3, Pages 119–132 121
September 2013. After immigrant Orkhan Zeinalov, al-
legedly, killed local youngster Egor Scherbakov, the
Biryolyovo residents destroyed the local warehouse and
a trade centre around which hundreds of illegal immi-
grants had been dwelling. Several non-violent ‘people’s
gatherings’ followed.
2) Ferguson riots, Missouri, USA, in August 2014.
There, unarmed African American teenager, Mike Brown
was shot to death by white police officer Darren Wilson.
The killing, as well as the defensive behaviour of the lo-
cal police department, spurred several waves of street
protests and peaceful support actions, including crowds
at Mike Brown’s funeral ceremony.
3) Mass harassment and rape of females on New
Year’s Eve of 2016 in Cologne, Germany. Over 1,000
women reported being harassed during the celebrations
on the city’s main square, allegedly, by re-settlers from
North Africa and the Middle East. After that, demon-
strations in protest were organized by radical political
actors (PEGIDA movement and the party ‘Alternative
for Germany’).
3. Research Questions and Methodology
3.1. The Outline of the Research Design
3.1.1. Research Questions
From what was said above, we have formulated the fol-
lowing research questions:
RQ1. How, if at all, do the users cluster within the
discussions, based on their attitudes to the major con-
flict actors? Does binary clusterization best describe user
grouping?
RQ2. Can the clusters be described as left or right
in relation to the respective national political spectra? If
not, then how could these clusters be described?
RQ3. Are there similarities in the cluster structure of
the discussions?
3.1.2. The Research Design
The way the RQs were formulated demanded an ex-
ploratory research design. To answer the research ques-
tions, we had to see which user groups emerged among
the influencers and what discourses they conveyed.
Our concept for detecting user polarization was that
political groupingwithin a discussionwas constructed via
a multi-dimensional combination of attitudes towards
political actors (as defined above). These major political
actors needed to be deduced from the discussions them-
selves. Then, the attitudes towards these players would
be decrypted by expert coders for the key users, or influ-
encers (Bodrunova, Blekanov, & Maksimov, 2017), usu-
ally the bearers of the spectrum of attitudes.
The data received after coding would undergo clus-
terization, with each user belonging to one non-fuzzy
cluster. Tweets by the users in the detected clusters
would provide the word frequency vocabularies, which,
after expert assessment, would turn into clusterization
vocabularies. The latter would then be applied to all the
users in the discussions, to see which users get into clus-
ters and which discourses form there.
This approach, even if simple enough and reliant on
expert intrusion, allows us to take into account the na-
ture of the users’ political discussion, as well as the lack
of linearity of their political positioning. We consider this
crucial for studies on conflict discussions, as it may al-
low the inclusion of conflict-invoked (e.g., pro- or anti-
minority), actor-oriented (e.g., authorities), and tradi-
tional political divisions (e.g., left and right and centre
and radical). At this exploratory stage, our method does
not imply machine learning or supervised approaches to
data classification; we use big datasets at this stage of
data collection only.
3.2. The Research Procedures
3.2.1. Data Collection and Pre-Processing
As this work is part of a bigger research project, our
methods of data collection were described in detail pre-
viously (Bodrunova, Litvinenko, & Blekanov, 2017). Here,
we briefly describe the steps we followed.
We used trendinalia.com to detect the initial dis-
cussion keywords and snowball reading to amplify this
collection, thus forming the vocabularies for crawling.
Trendinalia.com is a web service that allows daily moni-
toring of bothworld, regional, and national Twitter trend-
ing hashtags and words with no hashtag on an hourly ba-
sis, with the possibility of backdating; it has worked best
in terms of detecting the trending topics, compared to
the over ten other websites we had tried since 2013.
Using an API-independent Twitter crawler (Blekanov,
Sergeev, & Martynenko, 2012), we collected the con-
tent of the discussions. All publicly available Tweets and
the data on user interactions (likes, retweets, comments)
were collected by a two-step procedure. Step one in-
cluded the users who posted under the hashtags. Step
two detected a wider community of likers, retweeters
and commenters. On the discussion graph, only the step
one nodes have been visualized.
Due to reasons regarding feasibility and sample com-
parability, collection periods differed. Thus, for Russia
and Germany, the download period was 30 days after
the trigger event. For the USA, we had to select the two
weeks following the shooting, with Mike Brown’s funeral
as the central event. The user samples included:
For Biryulyovo—Step1: over 3,700 users; Step2: over
12,000 users;
For Ferguson—Step1: over 70,000 users; Step2: over
210,000 users;
For Cologne—Step1: over 12,000 users; Step2: over
99,000 users.
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3.2.2. Data Analysis
To answer RQ1, we needed to cluster key users by their
political views, define the cluster vocabularies, and apply
these vocabularies to the rest of the users, in order to see
the discussion clusters and interpret their discourses.
As we expected the influencers to be bearers of the
polarizing discourse, for each case, we defined the group
of influencers based on nine parameters: the number
of Tweets, likes, retweets, comments, in-degree, out-
degree, degree, betweenness, and pagerank centralities.
After these experiments, using various thresholds, the
top 50 users were chosen as the cutting line for each pa-
rameter. As many users were repeated in the top due to
several specifications, the duplicates were deleted. After
elimination of influencers with low numbers of Tweets
and bot-like influencers (with a percentage of repeated
Tweets over 50%) 156 users for Germany, 105 users for
Russia, and 105 the USA were left. But, for the USA sam-
ple (which was several times bigger in the number of
Tweets), the number of users was reduced by half, to 52
users. Their respective tweet collections for reading and
coding included 13,359, 3,012, and 9,540 tweets.
To define user attitudes towards political actors, we
developed scales for coding and coded the users (not
their Tweets). The coders were experts in inter-ethnic
conflict and, additionally, academic native-speakers, and
the level of inter-coder reliability asmeasured by Cohen’s
kappa reached at least 0.68 for any two sub-samples. The
coders used the scale from −2 to 2 to assess the atti-
tude of each user to the following groups that had been
identified as attitude triggers by reading the tweets be-
fore coding: 1) theminority (immigrants or African Amer-
icans); 2) ‘radical right’ or ‘radical white’—nationalists in
Russia, PEGIDA and AFD in Germany, and the Tea Party
and the KKK (as a label for radical whites) in the USA;
3) the incumbent country leaders—Vladimir Putin and
Dmitry Medvedev in Russia, Angela Merkel in Germany,
and Barak Obama and Hillary Clinton in the USA; 4) lo-
cal authorities and police forces grouped together as
the ‘oppressive and responsible’ actors. Attitudes to-
wards liberal opposition in Russia and to Republicans and
Democrats were also coded, as we found them salient in
the Tweets.
Based on this coding, the influences were clustered
to form groupswith similar combinations of attitudes. Af-
ter clustering, the Tweets of each group were merged,
and fully divergent frequency vocabularies of their dis-
courses were formed with the use of expert vocabulary
‘cleaning’. Then, we applied the vocabularies to all the
users in the discussions, to see how the discourses dis-
tribute within the discussion structure. We also mea-
sured whether these discourses formed distinct nebu-
lae; but even if they did not, we assessed which users
belonged to these discourses and interpreted the se-
mantics of their speech qualitatively. What mattered for
our analysis was whether the influencers formed distinct
groups; all the following steps were the consequence.
In detail, the research steps were the following.
1) Based on our coding, the influences of each case
were grouped with the help of a k-means clustering algo-
rithmwith sorted the distances.With the number of clus-
ters and the number of variables being diverse, the best
solutions were finally chosen based on Silhouette met-
ric S, within- and between-cluster square sums, exami-
nations of variable means in each cluster (see Figures 1
to 3 for Russia, Germany, and the USA, respectively), and
expert reading of tweets in each cluster. All the three in-
fluencer groups clustered well; Germany clustered best,
Russia followed, and the USA the least, but all the solu-
tions were sufficient by Silhouette from 2 to 10 possible
clusters. To identify the best solutions, other aforemen-
tioned metrics were used. Those solutions were:
For Russia: 4 variables (attitude to liberal opposition
excluded), 3 clusters of 49, 36, and 20 users, S > 0.4;
For Germany: 4 variables, 3 clusters of 99, 48, and 9
users, S > 0.5;
For the USA: 5 variables (attitude to Democrats ex-
cluded), 4 clusters of 15, 15, 12, and 10 users, S > 0.2.
2) For each cluster, word frequency vocabularies were
formed by merging the Tweets, ranging the words by
frequency, and expert reading. After reading, only the
words unique or highly characteristic for each cluster (for
example, twomentions in one cluster and 160 in another
would result into eliminating the word in the first one
and leaving it in the other). If the difference between the
numbers of mentions in any two clusters of the case was
smaller than ten times, the word was eliminated in all
the clusters.
3)We applied the thesaurus to the rest of the users in
each case; we wanted to identify the users who use the
words from the divergent thesauri. As a result, we have
received three types of users in each case: 1) the users
who belonged to clusters 1 to 3 or 4; 2) the ‘overlappers’
who used the language of more than one cluster; 3) the
users who did not use the discourses (mostly due to a
low number of their Tweets). To ensure a higher quality
ofmarking users, rather than using individualwords from
the thesauri, two-word combinations were used.
4) Based on this information, we constructed the
graphs of discourse distribution, with users as apexes and
user interactions (comments and/or retweets) as edges,
and calculated the indices for user centralities. We as-
sessed who were the most influential discourse bearers
and what they spoke about. We used Gephi algorithms
OpenOrd and Force Atlas 2 for graph construction (see
Martin, Brown, Klavans, & Boyack, 2011, on OpenOrd),
as the former favours centripetal graphing and the lat-
ter better shows visual homophily (see Figures 4 to 6).
To see whether the groups bearing the discourses were
tighter than inter-group connections, we calculated the
mean number of in-group and inter-group edges.
To answer RQ2 about the left or right nature of the
clusters, we partly recoded our coding data and cor-
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rected the graphs of means (Figures 1 to 3) accordingly.
Recoding was needed to re-interpret attitudes for and
against a given actor as pro-left or pro-right. E.g., the
influencers expressed attitudes towards political lead-
ers (Obama, Merkel, and Putin), coded −2 to 2. But, for
the respective political spectra, Obama is leftist, while
Merkel and Putin (Bluhm & Varga, 2018) represent the
rightist spectrum side. To ‘normalize’ the user attitudes,
we recoded all the pro-left views as −1 to −2, and all
pro-right views as 1 to 2 (see Table 1). By doing this, we
could show on the graphs of means whether the clus-
ters (and how many of them) were pro-left, pro-right, or
Plot of Means for Each Cluster
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Figure 1.Mean values of user attitudes to the selected political actors in attitude-based clusters for Russia.
Plot of Means for Each Cluster
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Figure 2.Mean values of user attitudes to the selected political actors in attitude-based clusters for Germany.
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Plot of Means for Each Cluster
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Figure 3.Mean values of user attitudes to the selected political actors in attitude-based clusters for the USA.
Figure 4. Communication within and between discursive groups of users in the discussions, with users as vertices and in-
teractions (retweets and comments) as edges; reconstructed by OpenOrd and Force Atlas 2 algorithms for Russia. Notes:
blue: Cluster 1, ‘anti-establishment nationalists’; red: Cluster 2, ‘news disseminators’; green: Cluster 3, ‘angry citizens’;
black: ‘overlappers’; grey: non-clustered users.
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Figure 5. Communication within and between discursive groups of users in the discussions, with users as vertices and inter-
actions (retweets and comments) as edges; reconstructed by OpenOrd and Force Atlas 2 algorithms for Germany. Notes:
blue: Cluster 1, ‘nationalists’; red: Cluster 2, ‘news disseminators’; green: Cluster 3, ‘anti-nationalists’; black: ‘overlappers’;
grey: non-clustered users.
Figure 6. Communication within and between discursive groups of users in the discussions, with users as vertices and in-
teractions (retweets and comments) as edges; reconstructed by OpenOrd and Force Atlas 2 algorithms for the USA. Notes:
blue: Cluster 1, ‘politicized observers’; red: Cluster 2, ‘media-oriented users’; green: Cluster 3, ‘human rights activists’;
purple: Cluster 4, ‘whites’ blamers’; black: ‘overlappers’; grey: non-clustered users.
mixed—see Figures 7 to 9 for Russia, Germany, and the
USA, respectively.
To answer RQ3, we qualitatively assessed the results
for RQ1 and RQ2.
4. Results
Our results show that the discourses identified by cod-
ing influencers cover a substantial part of the discourse
in all the cases: for Russia, the thesauri covered 31,5%,
in Germany, 63,4% and, in the USA, 73,5% of the users.
This shows that influencers’ talk reflects the discourse of
‘ordinary users’ to different extents in each country, but
everywhere we were able to detect the discourses that
were important for the overall discussion.
As the figures suggest, in all the three cases, group
structure was not binary; moreover, binary solutions
for each country would hide important discourses that
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Figure 7.Mean values for the recoded data on user attitudes towards the selected political actors for Russia.
Plot of Means for Each Cluster
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Figure 8.Mean values for the recoded data on user attitudes towards the selected political actors for Germany.
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Figure 9.Mean values for the recoded data on user attitudes towards the selected political actors for the USA.
Table 1. Recoding of variables for their left-right normalization.
Country Minority President Police-Authorities Nationalists Opposition Democrats Republicans
Russia Recoded Not Not Not Recoded — –
Germany Recoded Not Not Not — — —
USA Recoded Recoded Not Not — Recoded Not
actually constituted the discussions. Neither did the
group divisions correspond to the minority/pro-minority
majority/anti-minority majority scheme. Instead, the
clusters may be described as follows:
For Russia, the clusters include: ‘news dissemina-
tors’; ‘anti-establishment nationalists’; and ‘angry citi-
zens’. The first group was mostly neutral but formed a
substantial part of the political discussions by supply-
ing (posting or retweeting) news at each stage of the
conflict. The second cluster was clearly anti-immigrant
and nationalistic but differed from European national-
ism. Within the discussion, there was also an evident di-
vide between the nationalist groups who supported the
current establishment and those who actively opposed
it. The former saw the incumbent leadership as the
flesh of the 1990s’ elites who ‘had stolen the country’;
such users, therefore, blamed the national policymak-
ers for supporting the post-Soviet immigration. The sec-
ond type of nationalism—the pro-establishment one—
showedup in the third cluster of ‘angry citizens’. This clus-
ter united anti-institutionalists who were raising voices
against bespredel (‘the absence of limits’ and rules of
the game), but in differing ways. This diverse group in-
cluded pro-Putin nationalists who were ready to fight
with the Moscow riot police, liberal oppositional media
and public figures who criticized the policymakers, and
‘tired citizens’ who negatively treated the immigrants,
and the country leaders, and the local authorities, and
the nationalists. Unlike in the ‘news disseminators’ clus-
ter, the close-to-zero means for these variables here
were the result of pro- and anti-establishment views com-
pensating each other while the users united against po-
lice (see Figure 1).
For Germany, the clusters include: ‘news dissemina-
tors’; ‘nationalists’; and ‘anti-nationalists’. Discursively,
the biggest group of ‘nationalists’ unites two similar
sub-groups, one with slightly more aggressive tenden-
cies towards small liberal-oriented parties and activist
movements (like Antifa), and the other more critical of
the national government. The anti-nationalist group is,
however, also salient, making the German picture one-
dimensional in terms of political divisions (pro- and anti-
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minority), even if the dimension is not political-party but
issue-based. Also, the overlappers play a significant role
here, as they visually stand in between the two oppos-
ing clusters, thus creating bridges for public dialogue
(see Figure 5).
For the USA, the clusters include: ‘media-oriented
users’; ‘human rights activists’; ‘politicized observers’;
and ‘whites’ blamers’ (see Figure 3). Within the influ-
encers, the clusters were similar in volume, but, on the
big graph, the last two groups were relatively small-
scale, while the first two dominated the graph. Just
as in Russia, the media-oriented discourse was a part
of the political discussion, but the three other groups
were not neutral, especially ‘whites’ blamers’ and ‘hu-
man rights activists.’ The former actively blamed ‘the
white dominance’ and called for action against oppres-
sion. Interestingly, the hashtag #blacklivesmatter was
less important for this group than for themedia-oriented
discourse. However, blaming hashtags and words like
‘murderer,’ ‘republikkklan,’ or ‘kkkop,’ and calls for ac-
tion (like ‘#arrestdarrenwilson,’ ‘#boycottgofundme,’
or ‘#donotshopmonday’), were prominent. The other
group, very different from ‘whites’ haters,’ and linked
the case to human rights issues like abortion (#prolife),
gender inequality (#womeninequalityday), morality
(#moralmonday), and others. The group itself, as one
can see even from the hashtags, was polar in itself in
terms of left and right divisions on human rights. For
this group, positioning onMike Brown’s death was differ-
ent, expressed mostly by ‘don’t shoot’ hashtags. ‘Politi-
cized observers’ abstained from taking clear sides, but
discussed the Ferguson events in terms of its influence
upon the political process in America. Interestingly, the
cluster that mostly reposted media, was the most pro-
Wilson, as media, evidently, tried to remain balanced;
they also reported police press conferences that were
modestly defensive towards Darren Wilson.
Then, we looked at how the discourses we described
spread inside the graph. Our task was not to calculate
the level of homophily and prove user clustering for all
the discussions; the goal was to see how the discourses
actually spread and whether they spread in a similar
way—and they did not. For Russia and the USA, the
discourses mixed, but if in Russia we saw inter-cluster
talk, in the USA overlappers took almost all the space
in the graph centre. And in Germany, the graph was
clearly structurally divided. This was also proved by the
mean in- and inter-cluster weighted number of edges: in
Russia, the inter-cluster links took over (216 vs. 323.5,
respectively), while in Germany (4392.75 vs. 2890.25)
and the USA (21114.4 vs. 3755.2) in-group connections
were stronger.
Thus, the attitude-based grouping was different in
each of the three cases. Also, it was far from clear
left-right identifications. In order to show it, we have
recoded the variables as stated above, making pro-
left views negative (−1 to −2) and pro-right views
positive (1 to 2). We considered anti-minority, anti-
Obama/Clinton, pro-Putin/Medvedev, pro-Merkel, pro-
police, pro-nationalist, anti-opposition (in Russia), anti-
Democrat, and pro-Republican (in the USA) views pro-
right, while the opposite was marked pro-left. See the
full recoding scheme in Table 1.
The resulting graphs of means are quite telling (see
Figures 7 to 9). Both in Russia and Germany, the lead-
ers representing rightist sides of the spectra have ac-
tually taken pro-migration stance, and this has made
right-wing users who support nationalist movements
and speak against immigrants, move left and be against
the incumbent leaders, as well as against the local au-
thorities and police for ‘not protecting’ the host com-
munities. But the other clusters in the two countries
quite strongly differ from each other. While in Germany
issue-based leftism is clearly seen, the other Russian
cluster of ‘angry citizens’ diverges into three discourses
that combine clearly rightist, pro-establishment nation-
alism; liberal, anti-establishment oppositional speakers;
and politicised citizens. These politicised citizens, para-
doxically for external observers, do not support any of
the existing political factions, due to their impotence in
resolving local problems. Thus, at least two nationalist
discourses were detected by us for Russia—while in the
USA there are two very different left-wing clusters, one
clearly left, supportive of either Obama or Clinton and
based on human rights’ discourse, and another that was
sharply anti-white, even blaming Obama for not being
protective enough, which, in our rough coding, made the
cluster stick out to anti-Obama views on the rightist side
of Figure 9 (in effect, being extreme left). The cluster of
‘politicized observers’, interestingly, is reminiscent of the
‘tired citizens’ in Russia, as they are, on average, only
slightly pro-African-American and, more strongly, anti-
leader, anti-police, and anti-majority.
Another crucial observation is that, while the divi-
sions in the discussion clearly stem from local politi-
cal contexts, they are quite far from expectations de-
termined by the systemic political features of the coun-
tries. Thus, in the majoritarian USA where one would ex-
pect two-sided polarization, the clusters were, in fact, nu-
merous and the discussion was based on overlappers. It
was rather coalitional Germany that showed polarization.
And in Russia, just one side of the spectrum was present
in the discussion. Thus, it is not only the local political
markets but also the nature of the issue and issue-based
divisions that shape political clustering.
Overall conclusions are thus the following: The dis-
cursive schisms do exist in issue-based discussions, but
they do not fall into binary categories according to ma-
joritarian political divisions, and; they only partially fall
into the three-side divisions expected by the nature of
the issue. Instead, local political spectramay provoke the
formation of, for example, two leftist or two rightist clus-
ters. Only Germany has demonstrated the expected divi-
sions between anti- and pro-minority majority, while the
minority remained highly under-represented at all, like in
Russia—and unlike in America.
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The similarities can also be traced, but not in terms
of left and right divisions. First, in all the discussions, a
politically neutral news-based cluster played a significant
structural role. Second, all three discussions revealed
harsh anti-institutionalism, including that from the users
who, in conventional logic, were expected to support the
incumbents. Third, Germany and Russia were similar in
how nationalist clusters were against the conservative
governments, and Russia and the USA were similar in
how the ‘tired citizens’ were politicised against all the po-
litical sides.
5. Conclusion
In our article, we have combined content analysis of so-
cial media with cluster analysis and graph construction.
Our method has revealed greater complexity of politi-
cised discoursewithin ad hoc Twitter discussions on inter-
ethnic conflicts. Thus, we have found that there may be
several clusters of leftist or rightist views even if the num-
ber of clusters is minimal, and users may combine for-
mally leftist and rightist views if positions of political ac-
tors or the nature of the issue demand it. The groups
we have detected differ highly in their conceptualisation
from the traditional left and right divisions and left or
right labels cannot be attached to individual users based
on their preferences, like pro- and anti-minority stances
or treatments of country leaders or parties. We have
also shown that, on the graphs, the discourses intertwine
quite intensely if we do not force the graphs to artificially
diverge according to users’ political views.
Our research provides new input for rethinking the
political divisions that form online, onwhat grounds they
form, and how to detect them. The local political con-
texts, as well as the nature of the issues under scrutiny,
are major factors to be taken into account. In our article,
the ‘issue publics’ provide clues on how political opin-
ion is veering away from traditional left and right divi-
sions, and Twitter communication is more complicated
than the imaginary cocooned talk in echo chambers, es-
pecially for issues beyond elections and direct policing.
Limitations of our method stem from the subjectivity
of coding and from the low number of coded influencers,
but these may be partially overcome by automatisation
of coding collections and the increase of the number of
coded users thanks to automatisation. Our method may
be applied to detect hidden issue-oriented polarization
beyond one-dimensional left-right political spectra.
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